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Quantum Meruit for the Subcontractor:
Has Restitution Jumped Off Dawson's Dock?
Doug Rendleman*
After buying a "fixer-upper" home in Lexington, Virginia, Harriet
Homeowner contracted with Prime Contractor to remodel the house. To
prepare to replace Homeowner's steam and radiator furnace with a forced-
air heating-cooling system, Prime subcontracted with AsbestOut to remove
two hundred feet of asbestos-covered pipe from the basement. After
AsbestOut completed its removal, Prime exited. AsbestOut sued
Homeowner seeking a $4000 money judgment for quantum meruit resti-
tution. Its so-far-uncompensated asbestos removal, AsbestOut insists, has
unjustly enriched Homeowner.'
The question you are probably asking-"Has Homeowner already paid
Prime?"-I will place to one side for now, but I will deal below with both
"yes" and "no" answers.
Introduction: AsbestOut's uncomplicated $4000 lawsuit stands astride
one of the fault lines in restitution. Why does it turn out to be what
Professor Dan Friedmann calls a "rather intricate" subject?2 On the one
* Huntley Professor, Washington and Lee Law School. Many others have been involved in this
Article. Professor Andrew Kull, Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment and the other Advisers have stimulated my thoughts about the larger issues in restitution,
although nothing herein is ALI policy; my interest in the discrete subject was first piqued while
researching my yearly supplement for the mechanic's lien chapter in DOUG RENDLEMAN,
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT AND LIENS IN VIRGINIA (2d ed. 1994), and Ms. Julie Hawkins was
working with me on that supplement; Professor Mark Gergen, the faculty participants, and the law
review staff at the Texas Law Review Symposium on Restitution in January of 2001 encouraged me to
persevere; Professor David Carlson's careful readings and constructive comments at two stages
strengthened my analysis; Dean David Partlett's and Professor Leo O'Brien's thoughtful comments on
drafts were beneficial; and Mr. Joe Carpenter helped with footnotes. I thank them all. I thank as well
the Frances Lewis Law Center for its financial support.
1. The hypothetical is based on Haz-Mat Response, Inc. v. Certified Waste Servs. Ltd., 910 P.2d
839 (Kan. 1996).
2. Daniel Friedmann, Valid, Voidable, Qualified, and Non-existing Obligations: An Alternative
Perspective on the Law of Restitution, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 247, 273 (Andrew
Burrows ed., 1991).
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hand, lawyers, judges, and scholars perceive restitution's unjust enrichment
core to be capable of suppressing injustice across large areas of private
law. But, on the other, its bumptiousness has touched the positivist in
many, leading them to search for principles of confinement. One of the
major themes of this restitution symposium is the necessity of intermediate
limiting principles between the spacious generalization "unjust enrichment"
and the results in disparate disputes.
This Article's title was inspired by Professor John Dawson's pithy
observation about restitution's benefits and risks:
[A] general principle prohibiting enrichment through another's loss
appears first as a convenient explanation of specific results; it is an
instrument for quite practical and intelligible purposes. Yet once the
idea has been formulated as a generalization, it has the peculiar
faculty of inducing quite sober citizens to jump right off the
dock... . The ideal of preventing enrichment through another's
loss has a strong appeal to the sense of equal justice . . . . It
constantly tends to become a "rule," to dictate solutions, to impose
itself on the mind.3
In this Article, I use AsbestOut's quantum meruit claim to examine the
search for limiting principles. But first I will return to the image in
Dawson's second sentence above-the heady brew of undiluted unjust en-
richment is intoxicating enough to induce "sober citizens" (read "judges")
"to jump right off the dock." "Analogies," S.F.C. Milsom observed,
"always make one point at the expense of another."4 The need to confine
the "general principle" of unjust enrichment is the point Dawson
emphasizes. In short, by positing an unfortunate dunking in store for the
judge who relies on broad unjust enrichment principles, Dawson's analogy
supports absolute rules, rules designed to keep the judge "on the dock."
The aquatic pratfall that follows a decision based on general principles
makes Dawson's point at the expense of another important point: the need
for judicial flexibility and creativity.
Although I agree with Dawson's basic idea-the need for intermediate
limitations on unjust enrichment-I am skeptical about the absolutism
suggested by the view from Dawson's dock. An old saying expresses my
view a little better: "Unjust enrichment is a hard dog to keep on the
porch." But our dog does not live on the porch. The purpose of
restitution sometimes requires it to go "off the porch," to lead the hunt for
unjust enrichment. I will propose a frame of reference for restitution
3. JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 8 (1951). Professor Dannemann quotes the same
passage from Dawson in his Article for this restitution symposium. See Gerhard Dannemann, Unjust
Enrichment by Transfer: Some Comparative Remarks, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1837, 1851-52 (2001).
4. S.F.C. MILsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 100 (2d ed. 1981).
2056 [Vol. 79:2055
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disputes that will respect the integrity of limitations yet preserve a safety
valve for creative and individual decision making, depending on the facts
and context.
My own approach to restitution is a process-oriented one, influenced
by Texas's own Leon Green.5 Law created and administered through
courts is a question-asking process. The overarching principles that shape
the questions are moral, economic, and administrative. Rules, no matter
how moral and efficient, must be capable of administration through the
stages in the system of civil justice and workable with different people at
different phases of the dispute process. Lawyers advise clients, evaluate
disputes, and negotiate settlements. Lawyers miss many restitution issues
when planning litigation.6 As a result, they plead and argue restitution
badly. Trial judges decide pretrial motions and, in the United States,
approve jury instructions and instruct juries. Juries decide the factual
issues in trials. Finally, appellate courts pass on appeals. Professors spend
much of their time on the last stage of the process, telling appellate judges
how to decide appeals and proportionally less of their time on the other,
certainly more practical, and perhaps more important, stages of the
process, like primary conduct, lawsuit planning, the settlement process, and
trials in the first instance.
Stable and predictable rules coexist in tension with the courts' quest
for justice, explicit in the policy against unjust enrichment. The common
law is always incomplete, lying as it does in the path of changing times and
the adversary system of legal argument. Judges cannot predict how future
disputes will test prior rules. Accordingly, rules ought to be flexible and
capable of growth. Common law is created by judges; judges adopt the
common law to decide disputes. Imprecision lurks in common-law rules
because courts mold the common law at the same time that they apply it to
disputes. Reflective philosophers of law who believe in rules nevertheless
allow courts to change the rules.7 When common-law rules are not
efficient, not fair, or not administrable, the court can adopt new ones.
5. See LEON GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW (1965). My views are explained
in more detail in Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement:
Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 855-64 (1999).
6. See, e.g., Centex Corp. v. Dalton, 840 S.W.2d 952, 955 (Tex. 1992) (noting that although "it
is possible a contract claim may be held invalid, it is somewhat standard practice for a party to plead
an alternative quantum mernit claim.... [But] never at any point.., did [the party] assert a quantum
mernit claim"); Dobbins v. Redden, 785 S.W.2d 377, 378 (Tex. 1990) (noting that "[w]hile the theory
of quantum meruit might have provided Redden with an alternate ground of recovery ... Redden did
not plead this theory").
7. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 207-28 (1991) (suggesting that when the application
of a rule becomes socially, politically, or morally unattractive, the judge is empowered to treat the rule
as nonconclusive and thus subject to revision).
2001] 2057
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I suggest a series of questions to focus judges' and jurors' critical
judgment on the crucial restitution issues in AsbestOut v. Homeowner.
Was Homeowner benefited or enriched? Was Homeowner's benefit, if
any, at AsbestOut's expense? Was Homeowner's enrichment unjust?
What factors call for restitution? Are there reasons to withhold
restitution?8 Will granting AsbestOut restitution interfere with a property,
contract, tort, or other substantive policy?9 If AsbestOut cannot recover
under a contract principle, can the judge grant and measure restitution in
ways that advance, or at least do not retard, the contract principle? In
short, can the court grant and measure restitution yet avoid incongruence
with the related substantive policy? While answering these questions will
not steer everyone to the same solution, the various answers should focus
everyone's judgment on the important issues and lead to a beneficial
discussion, if not to universal approbation for a particular solution.
In this Article, I will examine the preceding series of restitution
questions in tandem with the reasons many courts and commentators would
give to refuse quantum meruit to AsbestOut. The answers, I will conclude,
should not always keep unjust enrichment on the porch. This is a con-
sequence of democratic government through courts. The common law is
not merely technical and politically neutral; common-law rules are not
forever found. Hard questions divide lawyers, classrooms, bar asso-
ciations, collegial courts, faculties of law, and even restatement advisory
committees. The generative process of shaping law inevitably leads
different people to different results on difficult questions. The untidy
uncertainty that follows is part of the process of formulating policy in a
democracy.
Related Doctrine: The most important issues grow out of the
relationship between restitution and related substantive doctrines. A
researcher will quickly find how complex the substantive issues in
AsbestOut's quantum meruit claim are. Restitution is only one of the three
relevant legal subjects. Although Virginia lacks direct quantum meruit
precedent, many other states have decisions on a subcontractor's quantum
meruit claim. 0 Moreover, many leading restitution scholars," as well
9
8. The reader will observe the influence of Peter Birks in formulating the foregoing questions.
See Peter Birks, At the Expense of the Claimant: Direct and Indirect Enrichment in English Law, 2000
OXFORD U. COMP. L.F. 1, text accompanying note 11, at http://ouclf.iuscomp.org.
9. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEXAS L. REV. 1277, 1285
(1989) (noting that "restitution should not undermine policies of tort or contract law that are served by
denying recovery").
10. The decisions are collected inJ.R. Kemper, Annotation, Building and Construction Contracts:
Right of Subcontractor Who Has Dealt Only with Primary Contractor to Recover Against Property
Owner in Quasi Contract, 62 A.L.R.3d 288 (1975) (1975 & Supp. 2000).
11. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.9(4), at 697-99 (2d ed. 1993); 3 id. § 12.20(3), at
469-74; 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RETUION § 10.7 (1978 & Supp. 1 2000); John P.
2058 [Vol. 79:2055
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as prominent scholars in the worldwide community of restitution, 12 have
commented on the general situation exemplified in AsbestOut's claim.
Following restitution, the second relevant legal subject is construction
and contract law. Construction contracts are an intricate branch of contract
law. 3 Mechanic's liens statutes are a complex construction law sub-
specialty based on discrete state statutes and existing in discrete legal
cultures, which usually fly below the horizon of scholarly radar. The
construction law and mechanic's lien features of AsbestOut's problem are
stripped to the essentials, omitting possible nuances like lien waivers,
performance bonds, and multiple corporations.
The third legal specialty is insolvency and bankruptcy, for although
Prime merely "exited," if Prime files a bankruptcy petition, the dispute
between Homeowner and AsbestOut takes on a new dimension that draws
Prime's and both litigants' creditors into our consideration. A subcon-
tractor's quantum meruit recovery may threaten the bankruptcy policy of
distributing a debtor's assets equally among similarly situated creditors.
Finally, neither AsbestOut's defendant (Homeowner) nor AsbestOut's
substantive theory (quantum meruit) are AsbestOut's first choices.
AsbestOut's best defendant is Prime, and AsbestOut's best substantive
theory is its contract with Prime. But Prime is out of the picture, remitting
AsbestOut, the subcontractor, to second- or third-best solutions.
Homeowner is AsbestOut's second-best defendant, after Prime.
AsbestOut's second-best substantive theory is a mechanic's lien against
Homeowner's house, which may let AsbestOut recover from Homeowner.
However, a mechanic's lien may be unavailable. This possibility leaves
AsbestOut pursuing its claim for quantum meruit, its third-best substantive
theory, against Homeowner, its second-best defendant.
Quantum Meruit and Contract: May AsbestOut, the subcontractor,
recover from Homeowner for quantum meruit, even though there is no
contract between the two and a mechanic's lien may have been available
to the subcontractor? Courts' "resistance to such claims," as Professor
Dawson has noted, "is deep-seated."' 4 This treatment will begin with
Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1445-46 (1974); Saul Levmore,
Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65, 88-89 (1985).
12. See, e.g., LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 59
(Gareth Jones ed., 5th ed. 1998) (stating that the breach of an obligation to pay by a contractor does
not necessarily entitle the subcontractor to sue a third party who benefited from his performance); see
also Birks, supra note 8, at text accompanying note 11 (noting that "the ground for recovery of [unjust]
enrichment is unlike any other. .. ."); Friedmann, supra note 2, at 274 (pointing out that "[u]nder
English law the right to restitution (i.e. quantum meruit) for unrequested services is very limited").
13. See generally JUSTIN SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION LAW (1997) (helpfully introducing
the subject's complexity and diversity).
14. Dawson, supra note 11, at 1448.
2001] 2059
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restitution, move to contract, to limiting principles, and then to the
mechanic's lien; it will discuss the concepts of unjustness and enrichment,
the distribution of risk, the measurement of quantum meruit recovery, the
effect of insolvency and bankruptcy, and ways to protect Homeowner from
double payment.
A short discussion of the excessive and confusing restitution ter-
minology will ameliorate some obfuscation. Restitution is divided into two
branches. The first-which this Article does not discuss directly-is
equitable restitution, comprised mainly of constructive trusts, resulting
trusts, and equitable liens. The second, legal restitution-also referred to
as both general assumpsit and quasi-contract-comprises the common
counts, mainly money had and received, quantum valebant, and our
subject, quantum meruit.
Quantum meruit-legal restitution to recover for the value of plaintiff's
services-is the technical name of AsbestOut's claim against Homeowner.
Courts sometimes exacerbate readers' confusion by referring to quantum
meruit as "equitable." 5  This may be simply a mistake. Quantum meruit
is legal restitution. "[1]t is clear that [a quantum meruit] action is at law
and the relief given is a simple money judgment." 6 By "equitable" the
15. See, e.g., Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 979 P.2d 627, 632 (Idaho
1999); Southtown Plumbing, Inc. v. Har-Ned Lumber Co., 493 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992); Ontiveros Insulation Co. v. Sanchez, 3 P.3d 695, 699 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000); Columbia
Wholesale Co. v. Scudder May N.V., 440 S.E.2d 129, 131 n.1 (S.C. 1994).
16. 1 PALMER, supra note 11, § 1.2, at9; see also Commerce P'ship 8098 Ltd. P'ship v. Equity
Contracting Co., 695 So. 2d 383, 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that subcontractor restitution
is an action at law); 1 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 4.2(3), at 583 (asserting that quantum meruit, one of
the common counts, is legal restitution); I id. § 2.6(3), at 157 (asserting that restitution claims are at
law because "they seek simply money relief" and because historically they have been brought in
separate courts of law).
A court's incorrect classification of quantum meruit as "equitable" may lead the court to
improperly refuse ajury trial. "Since plaintiff sought damages in quantum meruit, the claim was based
in equity, and presented an issue for the court rather than a jury." L.K. Comstock & Co. v. Becon
Constr. Co., 932 F. Supp. 906, 909 n.I (E.D. Ky. 1993).
A Virginia mechanic's lien action is in chancery, and thus equitable, and there is no right to a
jury trial. A subcontractor could sue the owner for quantum meruit in a separate action at law and seek
a jury trial and a money judgment. What if, however, the subcontractor asserts its quantum meruit
claim against the owner alternatively in its action on an alleged mechanic's lien? There are two
possibilities. Either the judge would try the subcontractor's quantum meruit claim with the rest of the
action under the doctrine of equitable cleanup, or the judge could transfer the subcontractor's quantum
meruit claim to the law side for the jury trial. 1 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 2.6(4), at 169-70. If the
subcontractor's mechanic's lien fails completely, for example because hazardous waste removal does
not qualify for a mechanic's lien, then the option of transfer to the law side is more desirable. If, on
the other hand, the subcontractor asserts another form of restitution, an equitable lien, in a mechanic's
lien action, then this chancery remedy will raise no jury trial issue. Avoiding the confusion are states
that have wisely followed the federal approach and merged law and equity as far as the constitutional
jury right permits. See FED. R. CIv. P. I (asserting that the Rules apply regardless of whether the
cases are considered legal or equitable), 2 (requiring a single form of action), 38 (preserving the right
to trial by jury).
2060
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courts may mean equitable in the nontechnical sense of "fairness, rectifying
injustice," not in the technical sense of "equitable jurisdiction in the court
of chancery. "17
The next layer of linguistic disarray surfaces when a court or
commentator says that quasi-contract, quantum meruit restitution, is based
on a promise or contract implied in law. Such statements lead to confusion
between contracts implied in law and contracts implied in fact. Quasi-
contract, of the quantum meruit variety, began in medieval common law
in the form of action named general assumpsit. 8 The early English
judges invented the legal fiction that the law "implied" a contract where no
actual contract existed. 9 Their goal was simple and laudable: to employ
the assumpsit writ to prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment.' The
court would "imply" that the defendant made a fictional promise to restore
or give to the plaintiff an asset which, if retained by the defendant, would
unjustly enrich the defendant.2" Except for the legal fiction necessary to
base legal restitution in assumpsit, neither an express contract nor a
contract implied in fact is essential for quantum meruit.2 Nevertheless,
a claimant's recovery for services furnished to a defendant often grows out
of a business and bargaining environment. Moreover, a well-advised
plaintiff will often plead quantum meruit as a fallback to a preferred
contract count. Understanding would be advanced and the fog of obfus-
cation would be dissipated somewhat if both "contract implied in law" and
"quasi-contract" were eliminated from the legal vocabulary.3
Limiting Principles: The next part discusses restitution and several
principles of confinement, each of which would, if applied, keep the judge
"on the dock," restrict AsbestOut's recovery to its contract with Prime,
and prevent AsbestOut from recovering quantum meruit from Homeowner.
A court may limit AsbestOut's potential recovery to its contract with
Prime, expressing this conclusion by saying there was no "privity"-no
17. See Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment,
79 TEXAS L. REv. 2083, 2088-89 (2001) (discussing the different ways courts use the term "equity"
in restitution cases and concluding that courts should not link "equity" to unjust enrichment in the sense
of correcting particular injustices).
18. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 415 (3d ed. 1990).
19. See id.
20. See id. at 424-25.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 415. See also MILSOM, supra note 4, at 355 (noting that such legal fictions were
a mechanism "by which assumpsit was able to reach beyond debt into the ambit of the old action of
account, and to recover for the common law some of its lost conceptual potentialities in quasi-contract
and restitution").
23. 1 PALMER, supra note 11, § 1.2, at 8 (suggesting this elimination upon surveying the history
of quasi-contract and noting that courts are not "fully aware of the fundamental difference between a
contract implied in fact and 'a contract implied in law'").
2001] 2061
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contract between AsbestOut and Homeowner.24 This assertion begs the
question. Quantum meruit is a freestanding theory of recovery, separate
from property, contract, and tort. Confusing "implied contract" terminol-
ogy may have led these courts to overlook "contract implied in law" as a
branch of restitution rather than a branch of express contract. z5 Denying
the existence of restitution-quantum meruit as a body of principle separate
from contract prevents courts from reversing unjust enrichment. Thus the
court would err if it held, as some courts have held, that in the absence of
a contract between Homeowner and AsbestOut, AsbestOut cannot recover
from Homeowner for quantum meruit.26
The 1937 Restatement of Restitution's section 110 is a more elaborate
limiting principle. Section 110 assumes, as a restatement of restitution
must, the existence of restitution; but it maintains that "[a] person who has
conferred a benefit upon another as the performance of a contract with a
third person is not entitled to restitution from the other merely because of
the failure of performance by the third person. " " In other words, if
AsbestOut benefits Homeowner while performing its contract with Prime,
AsbestOut cannot recover restitution from Homeowner.
Professor Dannemann's analysis of German restitution doctrine's
treatment of claims like AsbestOut's resembles that of Restatement section
110, but it is based on more sophisticated reasoning. The general German
rule prompts restitution when the defendant's gain is at the expense of the
plaintiff and unsupported by a legal ground.28 While a necessary pre-
requisite for restitution, the plaintiff's satisfaction of the general rule is not
sufficient.29 In addition, the restitution defendant must have received the
benefit as a result of performance by the restitution plaintiff."
24. See, e.g., Graystone Materials Inc. v. Pyramid Champlain Co., 604 N.Y.S.2d 295 (App. Div.
1993); Metro. Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Herbert Constr. Co., 583 N.Y.S.2d 497 (App. Div. 1992); Sybelle
Carpet & Linoleum of Southampton, Inc. v. East End Collaborative, Inc., 562 N.Y.S.2d 205 (App.
Div. 1990).
25. See GOFF & JONES, supra note 12, at 58 ("At first it was said that the [subcontractor's] claim
must fail because there was no privity between the parties; but that requirement, which is a relic of the
heresy of implied contract, has been justly condemned as 'unintelligible.'"); see also Paschall's, Inc.
v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1966) (stating that lack of privity does not bar quantum
meruit).
26. Haz-Mat Response, Inc. v. Certified Waste Servs. Ltd., 910 P.2d 839, 847 (Kan. 1996).
27. RESrATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 110 (1937); see also Advance Leasing & Crane Co. v. Del
E. Webb Corp., 573 P.2d 525, 526 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (citing § 110 approvingly in its finding that
a subcontractor could not recover from a general contractor on the theory of quantum menlit); Henning
v. Sec. Bank, 564 N.W.2d 398, 403-04 (Iowa 1997) (citing § 110 as a basis for finding that
subcontractors do not have a common-law right of action on a theory of unjust enrichment or implied
contract).
28. See Dannemann, supra note 3, at 1839-40.
29. See id. at 1845-46.
30. See id.
[Vol. 79:20552062
HeinOnline  -- 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2062 2000-2001
Quantum Meruit for the Subcontractor
This limiting principle, Dannemann observes, prevents the general rule
"from catching more than was bargained for."31 The plaintiff must have
consciously shifted an asset to the defendant "with a particular obligation
in mind."32  This limitation confines restitution claims to the legal
relationships they arise from and prevents plaintiffs from using restitution
to leapfrog the "true" defendant to find a solvent defendant. If applicable,
this doctrine would bar AsbestOut's quantum meruit claim against
Homeowner,33 for AsbestOut did not "shift an asset" to Homeowner with
an AsbestOut-Homeowner obligation in mind.'
Professor Peter Birks would also erect a fence around AsbestOut's
contract with Prime and emphasize AsbestOut's "proper defendant,"
Prime; while admitting exceptions, Birks's analysis forbids AsbestOut from
"leapfrog[ging]" Prime to recover restitution from Homeowner.
English restitution, Birks assumes, is expanding beyond a prerequisite of
direct enrichment, which would require the defendant's "plus," or enrich-
ment, to match the plaintiff's "minus," or loss.36 Indeed, English
restitution is moving in the direction of accepting the defendant's
"interceptive subtraction" in the absence of the plaintiff's loss. Seeking
to confine this "leapfrogging" claim, Birks comes to rest on a principle
similar to Restatement section 110: a court, following his reasoning, will
forbid AsbestOut from jumping over Prime, a party to its valid contract,
to recover restitution from Homeowner "who received a benefit from
[AsbestOut's] performance of that contract., 38
Applying Birks's analysis leads to the following description:
AsbestOut performed its contract with Prime; Prime is "the immediate
recipient;" Homeowner has been "directly, or immediately enriched" at
Prime's expense; Homeowner is "only a remote recipient" of AsbestOut's
performance; AsbestOut cannot "leapfrog" over Prime to recover from
Homeowner.39 Birks indicates two policy reasons for such a prohibition:
(1) AsbestOut, who dealt with Prime, must take the risk of Prime's "bad
behavior or insolvency"; (2) allowing AsbestOut to leapfrog Prime and
recover restitution from Homeowner would also subvert the "insolvency
regime. "'




35. Birks, supra note 8, at text preceding note 65.
36. Id. at II(1), 1.
37. Id. at 1(3).
38. Id. at IV, 3.
39. Id. at 11(2), 1.
40. See id. at MI(3)(d); see also Pendleton v. Sard, 297 A.2d 889, 895 (Me. 1972) (finding no
contract implied by law between a property owner and a subcontractor and that there are many other
2001] 2063
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Professor Levmore's article takes a position similar to Birks's, albeit
one more influenced by market economic theory. Denying a subcontractor
quantum meruit from an owner, he maintains, encourages subcontractors
(1) to check the credit of contractors and (2) to charge a risk premium.4
Moreover, a subcontractor's knowledge that a court will not order an
owner to pay restitution sets the boundary on the subcontractor's search for
viable defendants and reduces its transaction costs. 2
Each of the limiting principles summarized above will bar AsbestOut
from recovering restitution; however, none responds satisfactorily to
AsbestOut's claim to recover for a benefit it conferred on Homeowner. A
plaintiff's contract with another may sometimes be a reason for a court to
deny it recovery of restitution from a defendant, but the limiting principles
overstate the plaintiff's contract with another as a reason for a court always
to deny restitution. Such broad limiting principles constrain the lower
court's ability to make mistakes, to "jump right off the dock." However,
they also prevent the court from reversing unanticipated specific instances
of unjust enrichment and from developing the common law to respond to
changing conditions and perceptions of injustice.
Both Dannemann and Birks use a "leapfrogging" metaphor to posit a
"true" contract defendant athwart the plaintiff's path to restitution; that
metaphor shows their subordination of restitution to contract. Birks
describes the relationships in terms of directness and indirectness; this
further emphasizes the primacy of contract over restitution. It downgrades
restitution as a freestanding legal doctrine, and it elevates contract
unnecessarily. The question neither Dannemann, Birks, nor Levmore asks
is whether the court ought to countenance the spectacle of Homeowner
retaining the benefit of AsbestOut's services without paying anyone.
The better inquiry poses questions about restitution and contract
principles. Why can't AsbestOut recover in contract? Prime is absent.
AsbestOut lacks a defendant, or lacks a solvent defendant. Can the court
grant AsbestOut restitution from Homeowner and measure its recovery in
a way that will reverse Homeowner's unjust enrichment without improperly
undermining related contract principles? I will return below to Birks's and
Levmore's justification, that AsbestOut assumed the credit risk of Prime.
Ultimately, though, I argue that a court that pursues the inquiry in this
paragraph will advance both the goal of reversing unjust enrichment and
the concerns which led to the absolute bars on recovery.
considerations, including the subcontractor's extension of credit to the prime contractor, that will "tend
to prevent any 'enrichment' from being 'unjust'").
41. Levmore, supra note 11, at 88.
42. Id. at 88-89.
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Quantum Meruit Confined: Professor Friedmann, who sympathizes
with the general idea of confinement is, however, not convinced by those
who, without more explanation, erect a legal barrier to restrict AsbestOut
to recovery from its contract partner, Prime. He finds a more precise
limitation: quantum meruit restricts a plaintiffs recovery when the
recipient of a service, Homeowner, has not requested the service from the
provider, AsbestOut.43
This position leads me to discuss whether and how quantum meruit
differs from other forms of restitution. The Kansas court stated quantum
meruit's three "elements":
(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge of the benefit by the defendant; and (3)
the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the
benefit without payment of its value.'
The Kansas court's inquiry asks whether the owner accepted the subcon-
tractor's work under circumstances which notified it that the subcontractor
expected to be paid by the owner.45 The court's analysis is, up to this
point, broader than Professor Friedmann's, for the court stops short of
requiring a request by the recipient-owner to the provider-subcontractor.
The Kansas court further limited the subcontractor's opportunity to
maintain quantum meruit by adding that the court can grant the subcon-
tractor restitution only under one of three circumstances: (1) "[T]he owner
misled the subcontractor to his or her detriment." (2) "[T]he owner in
some way induced a change of position in the subcontractor to his or her
detriment." (3) There is "some evidence of fraud by the owner against the
subcontractor. "I
The Kansas court's statement seems to me too cramped and narrow.
The court appears to be saying that a subcontractor may succeed against the
owner in quantum meruit only if it could, in addition, prevail under
estoppel-promissory estoppel or fraud. A subcontractor who could re-
43. See Friedmann, supra note 2, at 274.
44. Haz-Mat Response, Inc. v. Certified Waste Servs. Ltd., 910 P.2d 839, 847 (Kan, 1996)
(quoting J.W. Thompson Co. v. Welles Prods. Corp., 758 P.2d 738, 745 (1988)); see also Green
Quarries, Inc. v. Raasch, 676 S.W.2d 261,264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (adopting a similar formulation).
45. See Haz-Mat Response, 910 P.2d at 847 (concluding that "an essential prerequisite to such
liability is the acceptance by the owner (the one sought to be charged) of benefits rendered under such
circumstances as reasonably notify the owner that the one performing such services expected to be
compensated... by the owner").
46. Id. at 847. Costanzo v. Stewart, in which the court granted quantum meruit restitution to a
subcontractor, has features of a contract implied in fact or an estoppel, for the homeowner "knew" the
subcontractor "was concerned about his payment and he assured him escrow arrangements had been
made." Costanzo v. Stewart, 453 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969). The Missouri court noted
this feature of Costanzo in Raasch, 676 S.W.2d at 266.
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cover under another theory would normally decline to rely on quantum
meruit. Moreover, requiring the subcontractor to fit itself into another
substantive theory before it can succeed in quantum meruit annuls quantum
meruit as a freestanding restitution theory based on the defendant's unjust
enrichment.
The Texas courts agree with another version of quantum meruit that
looks at the plaintiff's rather than the defendant's expectation. A
subcontractor cannot recover quantum meruit from an owner unless the
subcontractor expected to be paid by the owner.47
To me all of the versions of quantum meruit summarized above are
too narrow. AsbestOut expected to be paid by someone, Prime;
Homeowner expected to pay someone, Prime. Restitution principles ought
to be capacious enough to eliminate the intermediate step and to encompass
AsbestOut's "indirect" benefit to Homeowner. Should Homeowner's
"acceptance" of the benefit be a prerequisite to AsbestOut's quantum
meruit claim?s "Acceptance," Professor Palmer maintained, is often a
bogus issue, "a meaningless requirement, since it presupposes [the owner
had] a feasible alternative."'49 To begin with, Homeowner contracted with
Prime for a project that included the asbestos removal. It might be feasible
to remove a structure but to return hazardous waste is ludicrous and
probably illegal. A preferable way to analyze the quantum meruit issue
between Homeowner and AsbestOut is to follow the lead suggested by
Professor Kovacic and several courts and to ask more generally whether
Homeowner received and retained a benefit from AsbestOut's work and
next to inquire whether it is unjust and unfair for Homeowner to keep the
benefit without paying AsbestOut for it.'
47. See Berger Eng'g Co. v. Village Casuals, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978);
Crockett v. Brady, 455 S.W.2d 807, 808-09 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Crockett v. Sampson, 439 S.W.2d
355, 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (all holding that the party performing services must have an
expectation of payment from the party it sues to recover in quantum meruit).
Other courts agree that a subcontractor cannot recover quantum meruit from the owner unless
the subcontractor expected to be paid by the owner. See, e.g., McCorry v. G. Cowser Constr., Inc.
636 N.E.2d 1273, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (granting quantum meruit); Sybelle Carpet & Linoleum
of Southampton, Inc. v. East End Collaborative, Inc., 562 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206 (App. Div. 1990)
(holding that a subcontractor had no claim against a homeowner absent evidence that the homeowner
had assumed an obligation of payment to the subcontractor); Custer Builders, Inc. v. Quaker Heritage,
Inc., 344 N.Y.S.2d 606 (App. Div. 1973) (holding a general contractor liable to a subcontractor for
payment because the general contractor had made such an agreement).
48. See Haz-Mat Response, 910 P.2d at 847.
49. 1 PALMER, supra note 11, § 5.14, at 679; see also Candace S. Kovacic, A Proposal to Simplify
Quantum MeruitLitigation, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 547, 638-39 (1986) (criticizing "acceptance" when the
defendant cannot return or stop the benefit).
50. See Flooring Sys., Inc. v. Radisson Group, Inc., 772 P.2d 578, 580-81 (Ariz. 1989) (rejecting
Restatement § 110 and narrowing principles, and finding that the property owner was not entitled as
a matter of law to prevail on the subcontractor's unjust enrichment claim because it was evident from
the subcontractor's contract with the prime contractor that the subcontractor intended to be paid for its
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But even under the more general approach to quantum meruit in the
preceding paragraph, difficult questions of judgment and analysis remain.
Quantum Meruit as an Involuntary Contract? AsbestOut's argument
for quantum meruit must overcome Homeowner's response that the court
should not allow the subcontractor to foist a benefit onto an owner and,
without a contract, force it to pay. Courts hesitate to interfere with a
person's choice of how to spend her money. Preserving Homeowner's free
choice and autonomy to make unconstrained individual decisions militates
against a court-ordered transfer through quantum meruit. Assuming that
freely bargained consensual transactions allocate resources more efficiently
than courts' decisions, judges are reluctant to obligate a defendant to pay
a claimant for unrequested services.5" Quantum meruit restitution for
AsbestOut will, it may be argued, interfere with Homeowner's ability to
form contracts. Does the need to prevent Homeowner's unjust enrichment
overcome the court's reluctance to interfere with Homeowner's free choice
and autonomy?52
Consider the AsbestOut-Homeowner dispute in contrast to Painter who
drives down the street, spots Owner's house in need of painting, slaps a
coat of paint on it, and sues Owner for the value of his services. Painter's
quantum meruit claim would, if successful, force Owner to pay someone
she did not deal with, for a service she did not want, in a color she did not
pick. The coat of paint is a benefit she did not desire, did not contract for,
cannot easily remove, and may be unable to afford.
The AsbestOut-Homeowner dispute differs in several major ways.
Homeowner desired the remodeling; she bargained with Prime for
improvements; and her basic contract with Prime encompassed asbestos
removal. Homeowner expecied to pay someone, and her contract set the
amount she was willing to spend. The Homeowner-Prime contract may
contemplate-or perhaps it even permits or expects-Prime to farm out
services); Ayotte Bros. Constr. Co. v. Finney, 680 A.2d 330, 332 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (finding that
the defendant was liable to the subcontractor on the theory that "[riecovery for unjust enrichment is
appropriate when a defendant retains a benefit that has come to him at the expense of another");
Ontiveros Insulation Co. v. Sanchez, 3 P.3d 695, 701 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000); Paschall's," Inc. v.
Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tenn. 1966) (both stating that recovery in quasi-contract requires, most
significantly, that the defendant's enrichment be unjust); Kovacic, supra note 49, at 638.
51. Andrew Kull, Restitution and the Noncontractual Transfer, 11 J. CONT. L. 93, 93-97 (1997)
(stating that because contract is superior to restitution as a means of regulating a given transaction, a
claim in restitution, except as against a wrongdoer, is inevitably a disfavored recourse); Levmore, supra
note 11, at 79-82 (explaining that denying restitution encourages a well-developed or "thick" market
of many active buyers and sellers).
52. 1 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 4.9(1), at 681 (stating that many unsolicited benefits cases make
sense if understood as judicial efforts to respect the defendant's autonomy while also minimizing his
unjust enrichment); id. § 4.9(2), at 683 (explaining that the right of self-determination through personal
choices is central to the concept of a free society).
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parts of the remodeling project to others. While we cannot say that Prime
was Homeowner's agent with authority to pick subagents like AsbestOut,
the analogy to agency is evocative. Prime selected AsbestOut to remove
the asbestos. AsbestOut's asbestos removal under the Prime-AsbestOut
agreement conforms to both contracts' specifications. AsbestOut seeks to
recover from Homeowner for performance under a valid contract but one
with someone else. The Prime-AsbestOut contract negates any notion that
AsbestOut was gratuitously conferring a gift on Homeowner.5 3  Finally,
as will be discussed below, if Homeowner has not paid Prime, AsbestOut's
recovery of quantum meruit will prevent Homeowner's unjust
enrichment.'
Two leading restitution scholars favored restitution. Professor
Palmer's position was that "in circumstances in which it is apparent that
the owner's obligation to the general contractor will not be enforced,
restitution in favor of the [unpaid] subcontractor should be granted." 5
Professor Dawson's conclusion was similar. 6
The argument for arbitrary barriers to bar AsbestOut's quantum meruit
claim against Homeowner has yielded to a more open-textured analysis
focusing on benefit, unfairness, and related substantive policy. But why
should the court grant restitution to AsbestOut, who might have prevented
this whole mess by filing a mechanic's lien?
Quantum Meruit and the Mechanic's Lien: Should the court preclude
AsbestOut's quantum meruit recovery from the owner because' of a
mechanic's lien statute? Mechanic's liens protect persons whose labor and
materials add value to a property owner's land. 7 The goal of the statutes
is to provide a way for those who improve real property to be paid or
53. See Flooring Systems, 772 P.2d at 581 (finding that the contract between Flooring and Five
Star, a third party, indicated Flooring's intent to be paid).
54. See Costanzo v. Stewart, 453 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (finding that the theory
of unjust enrichment did allow a subcontractor to recover restitution against the property owner).
55. 2 PALMER, supra note 11, § 10.7, at 424-25; see also Haz-Mat Response, Inc. v. Certified
Waste Servs. Ltd., 910 P.2d 839, 847 (Kan. 1996) (concluding that "an essential prerequisite to such
liability is the acceptance by the owner (the one sought to be charged) of benefits rendered under such
circumstances as reasonably notify the owner that the one performing such services expected to be
compensated... by the owner"); Robert Dugan, Mechanic'sLiensfor Improvements on Real Property,
25 S.D. L. REv. 238, 265 (1980) (stating that "where the owner is shielded, by the lack of privity or
by the insolvency of an intermediary party, from paying for an improvement made at another's behest,
the courts in a number of ... jurisdictions have imposed liability upon the owner under restitutionary
theory.. ").
56. Dawson, supra note 11, at 1457-58 (asserting that the most "plausible" solution would be to
allow restitution to be "held in reserve to insure ... against deficits in the return promised" when a
benefit is conferred upon a stranger).
57. See DOUG RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND LIENS IN VIRGINIA § 6.1, at 278
(2d ed. 1994); SWEET, supra note 13, § 5.10, at 171.
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repaid out of that property. 8 To this end, the statutes create a lien in
favor of someone who improves another's land under contract and provide
for perfection through filing and satisfaction of technical prerequisites. 9
In some states, mechanic's liens are standard features in construction sites;
in others a mechanic's lien is rare, foreshadowing trouble.'
The mechanic's lien statutes are built on two overarching pillars: to
assure payment for those who improve property; and to prevent an owner's
unjust enrichment.6 1 A- landowner who knowingly accepts the benefit of
another's labor or supplies should pay for the improvement. Because of
mechanic's lien statutes, "one sector of our economy-the construction
industry and its work force and suppliers-[receives] firmer assurance of
its promised rewards than is given by the standard machinery of contract
enforcement." '62 In aid of these policies, a subcontractor who lacks a
contract with the tract owner may perfect a mechanic's lien on the owner's
property for the value of the improvements it added. "[T]he owner's
consent to the prime contract subjects his land to the costs of the entire
enterprise."'63 In many states, a subcontractor's mechanic's lien does not
depend on the state of the accounts between the owner and the prime
contractor.' In these states, an unpaid subcontractor may file for a
mechanic's lien against the land and indirectly against the landowner even
though the landowner has paid the prime contractor.65 Under Virginia
mechanic's lien law, moreover, a subcontractor, lacking a contract with the
owner, may perfect a mechanic's lien on the land and even obtain the
owner's personal liability under some circumstances, but the subcontractor
must give the owner notice of the mechanic's lien to ensure that the owner
does not pay the prime contractor. 6
There are two kinds of legal reasons a subcontractor may lack a
mechanic's lien. First, the subcontractor may be disqualified for a
mechanic's lien because it did not file in time, did not satisfy a statutory
technicality, or, in Virginia, did not notify the owner before filing.
Second, a mechanic's lien may not be available to the subcontractor; for
example, in the decision that the AsbestOut dispute was based on, the
Kansas court held that the subcontractor's removal of hazardous waste was
58. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 57, § 6.1, at 278; SWEET, supra note 13, § 10.18, at 383.
59. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 57, § 6.1, at 278-79.
60. Id. at 278 n.2 (listing sources surveying various states' mechanic's lien statutes); but see
SWEET, supra note 13, § 5.10, at 171-72 (listing some approaches adopted by states and advocating
the abolition of mechanic's liens).
61. Dawson, supra note 11, at 1452-53.
62. Id. at 1451.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1447-53.
65. Id. at 1446-47, 1452 n.128.
66. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 57, § 6.6(B)(3)(a)-(b), at 315-17.
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not an "improvement" that qualified for a mechanic's lien under the Kansas
statute.67 Finally, even if a subcontractor and the project "qualify," a
particular contract may be too small to justify, as a practical matter, the
subcontractor's expense of filing and perfecting a mechanic's lien.
Still, should a court grant restitution to a subcontractor who, although
eligible for a mechanic's lien, has passed up the opportunity to file and
perfect one? A strong argument exists for barring this subcontractor from
recovering quantum meruit from the owner. A mechanic's lien is excep-
tional protection for the construction industry, but to qualify, the claimant
must satisfy technical prerequisites, including filing a public notice to alert
the owner and others. Some courts decline quantum meruit restitution
when the subcontractor has a statutory remedy-a mechanic's lien against
the owner-but has not completed the prerequisites for one within the
allotted time.6" The mechanic's lien statute, courts say, is the exclusive
way for a subcontractor to recover from an owner.69 This reason to
decline restitution sounds like waiver: if a mechanic's lien is available, the
subcontractor can only blame itself for delaying or omitting formalities to
perfect the instrument.
However, Professor Dawson called this "waiver" theory a
"makeweight" argument.7' If a subcontractor's work qualified for a
mechanic's lien, but the subcontractor did not file in time or filed in a
defective way, the subcontractor may, following Professor Dawson, never-
theless be eligible for quantum meruit. Other courts reject the line of
decisions cited in the preceding paragraph and hold that the mechanic's lien
statutes are not the subcontractor's exclusive method of reaching and
recovering from the owner.7 Focusing more on the goal of preventing
67. Haz-Mat Response, Inc. v. Certified Waste Servs. Ltd., 910 P.2d 839, 842-46 (Kan. 1996).
68. See, e.g., Green Quarries, Inc. v. Raasch, 676 S.W.2d 261, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that quasi-contractual recovery is not available when the subcontractor has "cut himself off
from... [the statutory] remedy due to his own delay or omission").
69. See, e.g., Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 979 P.2d 627, 64041 (Idaho
1999); Henning v. Sec. Bank, 564 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Iowa 1997); Brick Constr. Corp. v. CEI Dev.
Corp., 710 N.E.2d 1006, 1008 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999).
70. Dawson, supra note 11, at 1445-46.
71. See, e.g., Guarantee Elec. Co. v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1371, 1378-80 (W.D.
Ky. 1987); Ayotte Bros. Constr. Co. v. Finney, 680 A.2d 330, 333 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Commerce
P'ship 8098 Ltd. P'ship v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 So.2d 383, 388-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997);
G & G Langenbrunner, Inc. v. Davis Constr. Co., 488 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1984);
Columbia Wholesale Co. v. Scudder May N.V., 440 S.E.2d 129, 131 (S.C. 1994); see also United
States ex rel. Sunworks Div. of Sun Collector Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 695 F.2d 455, 458 (10th
Cir. 1982) (holding that recovery under the Miller Act is not an exclusive remedy against a general
contractor).
Professor Carlson made the following point to the author after reading a draft of this Article:
The mechanic's lien is a property theory that makes the subcontractor an owner, roughly
speaking, of the house itself. Quantum meruit is an in personam theory. Given that in rem
differs radically from in personam theory, the notion that a mechanic's lien statute preempts
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unjust enrichment, these courts allow the subcontractor to maintain
quantum meruit successfully.
The Arizona court in Costanzo furnished a more elaborate justification
for allowing a subcontractor to recover quantum meruit despite having
failed to perfect a mechanic's lien.' A mechanic's lien, the court
reasoned, is not the subcontractor's sole remedy against the owner; the
subcontractor may recover a personal judgment against someone who is
personally liable, here the owner who was personally liable for quantum
meruit.73 The subcontractor's right to a personal judgment against the
landowner, it can be deduced, depends on a contractual relationship, which
can be a quasi-contractual one.
The Costanzo court's reasoning implements the policy of preventing
the owner's unjust enrichment. It erodes the policy of encouraging an
eligible subcontractor to file a mechanic's lien to provide notice to the
owner and to later firms and people who deal with the owner, the prime
contractor, and other subcontractors.
The Virginia Supreme Court has interpreted the Virginia mechanic's
lien statute, which states that "no [mechanic's] lien shall attach ... unless
such repairs or improvements were ordered or authorized by the owner.
" The court said that the quoted language means that a mechanic's
lien "must have its foundation in a contract."'75 Virginia's statutory
mechanic's lien may not be exclusive because a subcontractor may secure
the owner's personal liability.76 The possibility of Homeowner's personal
liability may be the technical or statutory route to AsbestOut's quantum
meruit; the justification would be that quantum meruit will prevent
Homeowner's unjust enrichment in the absence of a contract or a
mechanic's lien.
Quantum meruit will mean that AsbestOut recovers a personal money
judgment against Homeowner, while in most states a mechanic's lien is on
the land. AsbestOut may thus have access to more assets than
Homeowner's other creditors. In Virginia, however, this risk is reduced
because the subcontractor may serve notice on the owner and obtain
quantum meruit is especially unpersuasive. Concerns about notice and timing requirements in
the mechanic's lien statute tend to go to the state of title in Homeowner and have no
.preemptive" quality with respect to the fundamental issue of Homeowner's unjust enrichment.
E-mail from David G. Carlson, Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, to
Doug Rendleman.
72. Costanzo v. Stewart, 453 P.2d 526 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969).
73. Id. at 528.
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-3 (Michie 1999).
75. Rosser v. Cole, 379 S.E.2d 323, 325 (Va. 1989).
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-11 (Michie 1999).
2001] 2071
HeinOnline  -- 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2071 2000-2001
Texas Law Review
personal liability.77  The courts have not adduced the money
judgment/mechanic's lien distinction as a reason to decline quantum meruit
restitution.78
Is there is a contractual base for AsbestOut's quantum meruit recovery
from Homeowner? Three possible interpretations may be put forward.
First, the Homeowner-Prime contract "ordered or authorized" the work
AsbestOut did and that contract is sufficient. Second, the Prime-AsbestOut
contract "ordered or authorized" the work. Third, the quasi-contract for
quantum meruit is a "foundation in a contract," as the Costanzo court
hints; this third way encounters the telling point, made above, that "quasi-
contract" is a name for legal restitution that need not concern an express
contract or contract implied in fact at all."
Granting quantum meruit to a subcontractor who, although eligible for
a mechanic's lien, did not perfect one, raises difficult issues of context and
judgment. A subcontractor, otherwise eligible for a mechanic's lien, who
does not file for one in time, does not file at all, or files defectively and
then seeks quantum meruit against the owner, has passed up an opportunity
to secure payment. It has invited the court to examine its reasons and the
context. Such a subcontractor should not, however, be automatically
disqualified from recovering for quantum meruit. For example,
AsbestOut's $4000 job may not justify the expense of filing for a lien,
especially if the state's legal culture does not favor routine filing for a
mechanic's lien.
Suppose, as with the removal of hazardous waste in Kansas discussed
above, a subcontractor's project is ineligible for the mechanic's lien that
will secure its payment from the benefited property.8" May a
77. Id.
78. See Dawson, supra note 11, at 1445-47 (noting that courts generally do not refer to distinctions
between money judgments and mechanic's liens in their decisions, but instead rely solely on theories
of unjust enrichment to deny restitution). An exception is Pendleton v. Sard, 297 A.2d 889, 895 (Me.
1972). The personal money judgment argument is not effective against a subcontractor's request for
an equitable lien, another form of restitution.
79. A federal court decision under the forfeiture statutes makes a related point. The players were
a buyer, a criminal seller, and the government seeking to forfeit the seller's land for criminal activity.
While the buyers' contract of sale was executory, they improvedthe seller's property to qualify for
financing. Then, as the seller's interest was being forfeited to the government, the buyers filed a
mechanic's lien. The court struck down the buyers' attempt to perfect a mechanic's lien on the ground
that a mechanic's lien must be based on a contract, oral or written. The binder contract, the court said,
did not qualify. United States v. 5.382 Acres in Franklin County, Virginia, 871 F. Supp. 880, 884-85
(W.D. Va. 1994), aff'dsubnom. United States v. Fisher, 61 F.3d 901 (4th Cir. 1995). The court also,
in dicta, found no equitable lien. Id. at 885 n.4. But the court founded its dicta on a view of equitable
liens as growing out of an express contract, not as an equitable restitution device to prevent unjust
enrichment. Id.; see also 1 PALMER, supra note 11, § 1.5(a), at 20-21 (discussing equitable liens).
80. See Haz-Mat Response, Inc. v. Certified Waste Servs. Ltd., 910 P.2d 839 (Kan. 1996)
(holding that a subcontractor whose work does not qualify for a mechanic's lien can bring a claim on
the basis of unjust enrichment, although the circumstances under which such a claim may be brought
are limited).
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subcontractor whose efforts do not qualify for a mechanic's lien maintain
quantum meruit? The disqualified subcontractor is free from the argument
that it could have filed a mechanic's lien but did not. Granting quantum
meruit to a plaintiff who is disqualified for a mechanic's lien will not erode
the mechanic's lien statutory policy of encouraging eligible mechanics to
file. The court should let this subcontractor recover under the usual
elements of quantum meruit.
If AsbestOut is disqualified for a mechanic's lien, because, for
example, it did not "improve" Homeowner's property, then the court
should let it proceed to the following analysis of unjust enrichment.
Unjust Enrichment: A defendant's unjust enrichment is the major
prerequisite for a plaintiff's quantum meruit. If Homeowner's house has
a higher market value without the asbestos, the barrier to AsbestOut's
recovery is not whether its removal work benefited Homeowner. The
crucial inquiry is whether Homeowner's enrichment was unjust. The
impediments are the Homeowner-Prime and Prime-AsbestOut contracts,
which in essence called for Homeowner to pay Prime and then for Prime
to pay AsbestOut. I return, as promised, to the issue of whether
Homeowner has paid Prime. If, pursuant to Homeowner's principal
contract with Prime, Homeowner has already paid Prime, the court ought
to consider Homeowner not enriched or, if enriched, not unjustly enriched.
The court should not require Homeowner to pay a second time.8" This
result requires the subcontractor to look to its contract to protect itself, and
it aligns restitution with private ordering.
81. See, e.g., Advance Leasing & Crane Co. v. Del E. Webb Corp., 573 P.2d 525, 527 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1977) (finding no unjust enrichment where a party to a lease with a contractor defaulted in
its contract with a third party; in the suit against contractor, the original lease payment constituted
adequate consideration and the plaintiff could not recover for the difference in lease prices);
Breckenridge Material Co. v. Allied Home Corp., 950 S.W.2d 340,342 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that unjust enrichment cannot exist when an owner would have to pay twice despite the subcontractor
not having collected its fee); Hydro Conduit Corp. v. Kemble, 793 P.2d 855, 858 (N.M. 1990) (finding
that unjust enrichment will not lie against a property owner who has already paid for the benefit
supplied by the subcontractor); Columbia Wholesale Co. v. Scudder May N.V., 440 S.E.2d 129, 131
(S.C. 1994) (denying recovery on a claim of unjust enrichment by a subcontractor against an owner
where the owner paid on its contract with the general contractor); see also 2 PALMER, supra note 11,
§ 10.7(b), at 424 n.25 (noting that restitution to the subcontractor should be denied in cases in which
the landowner has paid the general contractor for the work performed since the landowner has not been
enriched); Dawson, supra note 11, at 1446-47 (noting that courts generally find that an owner's
payment in full to the general contractor operates as a complete defense against unjust enrichment
claims). The owner's nonpayment of the prime contractor may even be an essential element of the
subcontractor's quantum meruit claim against the owner: one court dismissed a subcontractor's
complaint that failed to allege the owner had not paid the prime contractor. Green Quarries, Inc. v.
Raasch, 676 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that "[non-payment by the owner to the
general contractor must be pleaded by the subcontractor in order to state a claim based on unjust
enrichment," and denying recovery in the absence of such allegation by the subcontractor).
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After Homeowner has paid Prime, AsbestOut should look for recovery
either to its contract with Prime or to a mechanic's lien. If Prime, after
having been paid by Homeowner, has filed for bankruptcy and if it is too
late for AsbestOut to perfect a mechanic's lien, then AsbestOut suffers
nonpayment, the typical fate of a general creditor who has extended credit
to a future bankrupt and neglected to perfect a security interest.
AsbestOut's claim for quantum meruit has the best chance of suc-
ceeding when Homeowner has not paid Prime. In that event, absent
restitution, Homeowner may take the free ride on AsbestOut's effort,
which will qualify as unjust enrichment. In Costanzo, for example, the
homeowner had paid the contractor with a check that was not honored.
The individual contractor had left the state and the corporation was
bankrupt. The subcontractor, apparently relying for payment on an
escrow, had not perfected a mechanic's lien.'
Perhaps Prime has breached its contract with Homeowner and Prime's
sole proprietor has left the state. Another possibility is that Prime was
Prime, Inc., incorporated for one project and one project alone, and after
Prime, Inc. became insolvent, its sole stockholder disappeared. Or maybe,
although Prime, having done next to nothing before completion time, is in
material breach, AsbestOut has completed its removal satisfactorily. The
court might follow reported decisions and require restitution."
But does recovering restitution from Homeowner unwisely allow
AsbestOut to escape from the credit risk it assumed when it contracted with
Prime?
Risk: I return, as promised, to a formidable justification to refuse
restitution to the subcontractor. AsbestOut contracted with Prime, not
Homeowner. AsbestOut extended credit to Prime, not to Homeowner;
82. Costanzo v. Stewart, 453 P.2d 526, 526 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969).
83. Fed. Land Bank of New Orleans v. Jones, 456 So. 2d 1, 10-13 (Ala. 1984) (granting quantum
meruit); Flooring Sys., Inc. v. Radisson Group, Inc., 772 P.2d 578 (Ariz. 1989) (approving quantum
meruit); Costanzo, 453 P.2d at 526 (granting quantum meruit); Ayotte Bros. Constr. Co. v. Finney,
680 A.2d 330 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (granting quantum meruit); Zalay v. Ace Cabinets of Clearwater,
-Inc., 700 So. 2d 15, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (granting quantum meruit); Rite-Way Painting &
Plastering, Inc. v. Tetor, 582 So. 2d 15, 17-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no cause of action
in quantum meruit but allowing remand on a claim of unjust enrichment); Zaleznik v. Gulf Coast
Roofing Co., 576 So. 2d 776, 778-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (approving restitution for unjust
enrichment); Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 710 P.2d 647, 654-59 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (granting
quantum meruit); McCorry v. G. Cowser Constr., Inc., 636 N.E.2d 1273, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(granting quantum meruit because the subcontractor expected payment from the owner); Ontiveros
Insulation Co. v. Sanchez, 3 P.3d 695 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (granting quantum menlit); G & G
Langenbrunner, Inc. v. Davis Constr. Co., 488 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1984) (granting quantum
meruit); Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. 1966) (granting the contractor quantum
meruit from the homeowner when the owner's daughter made a contract); see also United States ex reL
Sunworks Div. of Sun Collector Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 695 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1982)
(recognizing quantum meruit under the Miller Act).
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AsbestOut accepted the hazard that Prime might not pay. If AsbestOut's
quantum meruit from Homeowner succeeds, AsbestOut will be liberated
from the danger of not recovering from Prime, its contract partner. If
AsbestOut recovers restitution from Homeowner, that, Professor Birks
argued, will neutralize the credit risk that AsbestOut took in its contract
with Prime.' In short, Birks remonstrated against letting a subcontractor
"leapfrog" its contract partner, a prime contractor, to recover restitution
from the owner of the improved tract because that would free the subcon-
tractor from the credit risk it assumed in its contract with the prime
contractor."'
Professor Levmore's reasoning is similar to Birks's. Homeowner has
employed Prime for her remodeling. Homeowner's contract with Prime
set the price of her benefit. Prime picked AsbestOut for the asbestos
removal subcontract. Homeowner has revealed her preferences and the
value of them. "[N]either market encouragement nor wealth dependency
explains" why the court would deny quantum meruit to AsbestOut.1
Nevertheless, citing the policy of visiting the hazard of Prime's default on
AsbestOut, Levmore favored refusing AsbestOut quantum meruit even
when Homeowner has "accepted" the improvement and has not paid
PrimeY7 The policy of allocating to AsbestOut the burdens and strictures
of its contract with Prime is a strong one.
But as an absolute bar to AsbestOut's quantum meruit, credit risk is
not persuasive. Professor Birks's and Professor Levmore's goal is a
worthy one in an economy devoted to private, negotiated exchange. To
describe the result by saying that AsbestOut assumed the risk of Prime's
default is to posit more of a legal conclusion than a legal argument. A
person assumes a risk if positive law says that he assumes it because the
court will assess his assumption of the risk in light of the preexisting legal
rule.
The question that both the professors have neglected is whether a court
should condone with equanimity the spectacle of Homeowner retaining the
benefit of AsbestOut's services without paying anyone. It is harsh to give
assumption of Prime's credit risk as a reason to deny recovery to
AsbestOut when Homeowner has the improvement but has not paid Prime;
moreover, it is unfair to leave Homeowner with a benefit for which she
agreed to pay Prime but now may receive free.
In light of the windfall to Homeowner that outright denial of quantum
meruit creates, may a court find a way to reverse Homeowner's improper
84. See Birks, supra note 8, at text accompanying notes 90-93.
85. Id.; see also GOFF & JONES, supra note 12.
86. Levmore, supra note 11, at 88.
87. Id.
2001] 2075
HeinOnline  -- 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2075 2000-2001
Texas Law Review
benefit and still visit on AsbestOut the credit-risk consequences of
contracting with Prime? The court, I submit, can serve both policies by
asking whether it can both grant restitution and measure it in a way that
does not erode the related contract principle of preventing AsbestOut from
avoiding the danger it undertook of Prime's breach or bankruptcy.
First, as discussed above, the court should refuse to allow AsbestOut
to recover quantum meruit from Homeowner if Homeowner has paid
Prime.8 The underlying AsbestOut-Prime contract's risk allocation is
vindicated, in part, by forbidding AsbestOut from recovering restitution
from Homeowner if Homeowner has already paid Prime. Second, as fol-
lows, the court should measure AsbestOut's restitution to avoid hampering
the contract policy of allocating Prime's credit risk to AsbestOut.
Measurement of Quantum Meruit: Granting AsbestOut quantum meruit
prevents Homeowner from retaining the benefit of AsbestOut's services
without paying anyone for them. Since AsbestOut's benefit to Homeowner
cannot be returned, AsbestOut will recover a money judgment. How much
money? The court vindicates the contractual allocation of risk by
measuring AsbestOut's restitution at a lower-than-contract rate to let
AsbestOut suffer the consequences of the credit that it extended to Prime.
I will develop this subject by examining the court's measurement
options in light of the relevant restitution and contract policies. I will
continue to respond to the argument that a subcontractor who accepted the
danger of a prime contractor's default risk should not receive restitution
from the property owner because that would subvert the contract's
allocation of risk.
The court has four ways to measure AsbestOut's quantum meruit
recovery: (1) the Homeowner-Prime contract, (2) the Prime-AsbestOut
contract, (3) the reasonable value of AsbestOut's effort-AsbestOut's cost
measured objectively, and (4) the work's value to Homeowner-the tract's
value after AsbestOut's work less its value before the work.
AsbestOut removed the asbestos, so it might aspire to recover as much
as the full contract price of its role in the project. Which contract?
If (1) the Homeowner-Prime contract and (2) the Prime-AsbestOut
contract call for the same rate, the contract rate is set. But if the rates
differ, which contract governs?
What if the rate in the Homeowner-Prime contract exceeds that in the
Prime-AsbestOut contract? Homeowner agreed to pay the amount specified
in its contract with Prime; the amount in the Homeowner-Prime contract
is the payment or performance that Homeowner bargained for. Letting
Homeowner off the hook for anything less than her contract with Prime
88. See cases cited supra note 81.
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will, AsbestOut may assert, leave her unjustly enriched. At the same time,
however, Homeowner will argue that the Homeowner-Prime contract ought
to set a ceiling on the amount she pays.
The rate in the Prime-AsbestOut contract is the amount or
performance that AsbestOut bargained for. Should AsbestOut recover
more from Homeowner for quantum meruit than it would have received
under its contract with Prime? It should not, I submit. AsbestOut's
quantum meruit should not equal or exceed the rate in its contract with
Prime, for that much recovery, which probably includes AsbestOut's
calculation of profit above its expenses, would obviate the credit risk it
undertook in that contract. The court can usually prevent Homeowner's
unjust enrichment without awarding AsbestOut any "profit."
Perhaps the amount in the Prime-AsbestOut contract exceeds the one
in the Homeowner-Prime contract. AsbestOut may argue for measurement
of quantum meruit recovery from Homeowner by the Prime-AsbestOut
contract rate. If so, AsbestOut's restitution from Homeowner might exceed
even the amount of the Homeowner-Prime contract.89 This will almost
always be an excessive measure, I submit, because Homeowner should not
pay more for restitution than her contract with Prime required. Nor should
AsbestOut recover an amount that includes any "profit."
The contract rate or rates can be compared to measurement by (3)
reasonable value and (4) addition to the owner's wealth.
AsbestOut will seek to measure quantum meruit by reasonable value
when it made a bad contract with Prime and the reasonable value of its
removal exceeds the contract rate. Where the plaintiff and the defendant
were parties to a contract that the defendant breached, courts hold that the
plaintiff may recover for its part performance as measured by its
reasonable value, even though that exceeds the contract rate.' If
Homeowner was acting in bad faith leading up to the rift, AsbestOut may
analogize to these decisions to seek the reasonable value of its part
performance.
The value of Homeowner's home after AsbestOut's work less the
home's value before the work equals the addition of AsbestOut's work to
Homeowner's economic wealth. If the court's sole goal is to prevent
Homeowner's unjust enrichment, then measuring AsbestOut's quantum
meruit recovery by Homeowner's economic augmentation supports that
goal. If that amount is below the rate in either contract, the measurement
will not allow AsbestOut to obviate Prime's credit hazard.
89. See Dawson, supra note 11, at 1452 (noting that in "three-fifths of our states the aggregate
collectible through mechanic's liens may exceed the price in the prime contract").
90. See, e.g., United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1973) (stating
that "[t]he measure of recovery for quantum meruit is the reasonable value of the performance"); see
also 1 PALMER, supra note 11, § 4.4, at 389 (noting that restitution is granted based on the reasonable
market value of the performance and is not limited by the contract price or rate).
2001] 2077
HeinOnline  -- 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2077 2000-2001
Texas Law Review
Some conclusions about measurement follow. I prefer that the court
respect the allocation of credit risk in AsbestOut's contract with Prime by
measuring the subcontractor's quantum meruit using either reasonable value
or addition to defendant's wealth (not to exceed the amount in the lower of
the two contracts). 9  In short, AsbestOut should recover for
Homeowner's benefit, not for the breached contract with Prime. The
possibilities leave options open to the parties to select and prove favored
measures, and flexibility to the judge to tailor the measure to prevent
Homeowner's unjust enrichment and to allocate all or part of Prime's credit
risk to AsbestOut, without upsetting related contractual interests.
In Raasch, the prime contractor was bankrupt.' What if Prime has
filed for bankruptcy?
Insolvency: Professor Birks interposed another reason to refuse
restitution to the unpaid subcontractor-the disruptive effect that restitution
would have on the insolvency system. 93 Restitution may treat AsbestOut,
one of Prime's general creditors, better than its other general creditors. If
Prime files for bankruptcy, Homeowner's debt to Prime under their
contract may be available to Prime's general creditors, including all
subcontractors. If Prime has performed completely but Homeowner has
not paid Prime when Prime files for bankruptcy, then Prime's bankruptcy
estate would be entitled to collect Homeowner's debt to Prime to divide
among all of Prime's general creditors, including AsbestOut. 94 Letting
AsbestOut recover quantum meruit from Homeowner and reducing
Homeowner's debt to Prime would treat AsbestOut better than Prime's
other creditors because AsbestOut would recover in full while Prime's
other creditors would receive a percentage-indeed a smaller percentage if
AsbestOut has recovered in full. In a typical bankruptcy, Prime's general
creditors will not collect their full debts, and perhaps they might collect
nothing at all; if AsbestOut receives quantum meruit from Homeowner, it
may collect its whole claim.
The argument that a subcontractor's recovery of quantum meruit will
create creditor inequality may persuade a court to deny the subcontractor's
restitution claim. The Raasch court accepted Professor Dawson's point
that allowing a subcontractor to recover quantum meruit restitution from
the owner treats one of an insolvent prime contractor's general creditors
better than others.95
91. One exception may be to let AsbestOut recover the reasonable value of its work if
Homeowner's fault led to the lawsuit.
92. Green Quarries, Inc. v. Raasch, 676 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
93. See Birks, supra note 8, at paragraph preceding note 91.
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1994) (outlining the duties of trustees in bankruptcies).
95. Raasch, 676 S.W.2d at 267. The court addressed the following possibility: the subcontractor
recovers in full from the owner who has not paid the prime contractor; the owner's payment to the
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That restitution sometimes treats a debtor's general creditors
differently is not a reason to deny restitution all the time. Courts should
reject the possibility that inequality may occur as a blanket reason to deny
quantum meruit to all subcontractors. The Primes of this world do not all
file for bankruptcy, and those Primes who do file for bankruptcy do not
always file before Homeowner pays them. My reading of the decided
appeals often left me unable to tell whether the prime contractor had filed
for bankruptcy; even when bankruptcy had occurred, the status of the
various debts was often murky. The effect of actual or potential bank-
ruptcy distribution on a subcontractor's quantum meruit ought to be a
matter for factual inquiry and contextual analysis, not an absolute barrier
to the subcontractor's quantum meruit claim.
If the court avoids prejudice to Prime's general creditors, can it do as
much for Homeowner?
Protecting Homeowner: Homeowner may be obligated by contract to
pay Prime, but Homeowner should not pay twice. Courts have dealt with
this problem by saying that, as a prerequisite for recovering quantum
meruit from an owner, the subcontractor must "exhaust" its remedies
against the prime contractor.96
Can the court ensure that quantum meruit between Homeowner and
AsbestOut resolves the whole dispute? If AsbestOut recovers from
Homeowner in two-party litigation, neither nondefendant Prime nor
Prime's bankruptcy trustee would ordinarily be precluded.' Both
Professor Palmer and Professor Dawson maintained that the court could
protect an owner against double payment by crediting or offsetting the
owner's payment of quantum meruit to a subcontractor against the owner's
subcontractor will be offset from the owner's debt to the prime contractor so it will no longer be a debt
that the owner owes to the prime contractor's bankruptcy estate; and there will be less money for the
prime contractor's other general creditors. More precisely, the Missouri court and Professor Dawson
said that a subcontractor's recovery of quantum meruit from the homeowner creates a "preference" for
the subcontractor over the prime contractor and other creditors. Id. (citing Dawson, supra note 11,
at 1447). Although not always technically a bankruptcy "preference," granting restitution may treat
one creditor better than others-the hazard to which they refer and to which I respond.
The subject of setoff and indirect preferences in bankruptcy raises nettlesome issues discussed
with wit, skill, and erudition in David Gray Carlson, Tripartite Voidable Preferences, 11 BANKR. DEV.
J. 219, 273-82 (1995). In addition, see Admiral Drywall, Inc. v. Cullen, 56 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 1995),
in which unpaid subcontractors claimed an equitable lien in undisbursed contract funds that they argued
outranked the contractor's bankruptcy trustee's claims to those funds. They were unsuccessful.
"Individual subcontractors," the court observed, "can seek mechanics liens." Id. at 5.
96. See, e.g., Maloney v. Therm Alum Indus., Corp., 636 So. 2d 767, 769-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994); L.S. Henriksen Constr., Inc. v. Shea, 961 P.2d 295 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Tum-A-Lum
Lumber v. Patrick, 770 P.2d 964 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
97. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.23 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that "[a]s
a general rule, a person's legal rights may not be concluded without an opportunity to litigate them).
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debt to the prime contractor.98 So Homeowner's payment to AsbestOut
releases Homeowner's debt to Prime because Homeowner's single liability
on the segment of the Homeowner-Prime contract allocated to asbestos
removal is a liability that runs ultimately from Homeowner to Prime to
AsbestOut and which is discharged when Homeowner pays the one ulti-
mately entitled to it. 99 In other words, if Homeowner pays restitution to
AsbestOut, the court should release Homeowner from paying a second time
to Prime.
Two other solutions to obviate the risk of Homeowner's double pay-
ment involve multiparty litigation and departures from strict quantum
meruit. t°  First, Homeowner may interplead the money due under the
Homeowner-Prime contract, asserting that AsbestOut may be entitled to
quantum meruit; Prime and AsbestOut can resolve their dispute in the
interpleader. "I Second, AsbestOut may sue both Homeowner and
Prime; if Prime is a codefendant with Homeowner, the court may sub-
rogate AsbestOut to Prime for recovery on the asbestos-removal part of the
Homeowner-Prime contract. In other words, AsbestOut is substituted for
Prime to recover the appropriate part of Homeowner's debt on the
Homeowner-Prime contract.'12
The court should not refuse AsbestOut quantum meruit because of a
theoretical possibility that Homeowner may have to pay twice. Instead,
factual and contextual analysis plus the two possibilities mentioned in the
preceding paragraph may lead the court to grant AsbestOut quantum meruit
if appropriate to reverse Homeowner's unjust enrichment.
Conclusion: Suppose the court resolves the issue of defendant-
Homeowner's benefit and that benefit's unjustness protects Homeowner
from paying twice and prevents an unequal distribution of Prime's limited
assets. Then the wiser solution is for the court to reject blanket reasons to
98. 2 PALMER, supra note 11, § 10.7, at 425 (noting that payment of the judgment by the
landowner to the subcontractor operates as a discharge of the landowner's obligation to the general
contractor, thus protecting the landowner from double recovery); Dawson, supra note 11,. at 1447
(arguing that where the owner still owes an unpaid balance on the contract price, the owner "could be
protected against double liability. . . by crediting any enforced payment to the sub on the owner's debt
to the general"). Professor Carlson's article discusses the preference issue in bankruptcy. Carlson,
supra note 95, at 273-82.
99. 2 PALMER, supra note 11, § 10.7, at 425 (noting that payment of a judgment to a
subcontractor operates as a discharge of the obligation to the general contractor).
100. 3 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 12.20(3), at 470-71.
101. Fed. Land Bank of New Orleans v. Jones, 456 So. 2d 1,2 (Ala. 1984) (interpleader action);
Flooring Sys., Inc. v. Radisson Group, Inc., 772 P.2d 578, 582 (Ariz. 1989) (recommending
interpleader); see also 3 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 12.20(3), at 471.
102. 3 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 12.20(3), at 470; 1 Id. § 4.3(4), at 607 (referring to the textual
example as a "kind of equitable garnishment that resembles subrogation").
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say "No" and, instead, to grant AsbestOut quantum meruit, measured
below either contract rate. Many courts, however, have bungled quantum
meruit appeals with muddled analysis, suborned by inappropriate and
misleading terminology. Conflicting authority exists at almost every
decision point between AsbestOut's filing and final judgment. The law of
restitution palpably needs theory and clarification from scholars and law
schools, as well as a modem and accessible restatement from the American
Law Institute.
But let us sit for a second on the edge of Professor Dawson's dock.
This Article's principal goal has been to use AsbestOut's difficult quantum
meruit claim to respond to suggested limitations-such as section 110 in the
first Restatement-that would always bar it. Many of these limiting
principles cut off restitution even when the common law should expand to
prevent unjust enrichment. The original Restatement and some scholars
propose limitations intended to refuse restitution to AsbestOut and to leave
Homeowner potentially paying no one for a benefit she agreed to pay for
in her contract with Prime.
Absolute rules that always bar restitution frustrate a court's pursuit of
unjust enrichment. A better analysis would refuse to grant a subcontractor
restitution only some of the time. The analysis that I have suggested
rephrases the valid policies underlying the limitations as questions about
restitution's effect on related substantive policies. These inquiries will
structure a frame of reference for a court to evaluate the facts in light of
genuinely related policies and to exercise contextual judgments about
whether to grant or deny a plaintiff's claim for restitution and, if the court
approves restitution, how to measure it. A court, following orderly "off-
the-porch" analysis, can grant quantum meruit to AsbestOut without
jumping off Professor Dawson's dock. Then restitution will fulfill its
promise-its potential to thwart unjust enrichment-and the common law
will retain its generative quality.
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